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I.

INTRODUCTION

States and municipalities today form the locus of innovation in
American government. But the popular and scholarly commentary on
public sector innovation overlooks its most crucial component: the
transformation of public sector labor-management relations that has
enabled local governments to change decisively their way of doing
business.
This transformation challenges longstanding bureaucratic
obstacles to competition and workplace productivity obstacles deeply
embedded in local law, union contracts, and government practice. Despite
its modest beginning, the movement continues to gain momentum and to
create public values altering outdated bureaucratic procedures and labormanagement norms. It emphasizes the hourly worker, not the white-collar
manager, as the key source of innovation and public value. This is a story
worth telling as practical wisdom to local leaders and labor law scholars
interested in the public workplace.
For decades, a failed model of labor-management relations pervaded
public organizations and frustrated efforts at reform. The stimulus for
change was a crisis in urban America. For two centuries, American cities
had thrived. Industrialization provided rich economic opportunity, urban
neighborhoods sustained civic involvement and community, and strong
families, religious organizations, and schools instilled unity and shared
values. By the 1970s, however, many cities were under siege. Tax
revenues collapsed as citizens departed to the suburbs, businesses followed
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the exodus out of town, crime and urban decay surged, and federal
programs exacerbated many of the problems they sought to correct. In
contrast, the 1990s were a period of renewal. Local leaders emphasized
pragmatism and experimentation often partnering with religious and civic
organizations to better meet human needs. Their policies freed cities from
dependency on the federal government and reduced crime, and partnered
with religious and civic organizations in meeting human need. By 2000,
cities long abandoned as unmanageable were undergoing a renaissance.
Reformed labor-management relations have been a cornerstone of this
reform. To be sure, many problems in urban America persist, but the face
of the municipal governments best addressing these problems has changed.
The past decade has shown that reshaping the labor-management
relationship, and structurally reforming bureaucratic procedure and
organization, can unlock enormous value. Rather than being defined by its
stereotypes, the public workplace can be a place of productivity, human
capital formation, and job satisfaction. This essay sketches out key features
of the traditional public sector workplace, describe the implications for the
public employees, and then explore how competition and structural reform
of bureaucratic procedures can improve labor-management relations and
unlock public value.

II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE

At least five features of the traditional public sector workplace thwart
the efficient delivery of public goods. The origin of these features vary and
include work rules, badly negotiated contracts, state law, and engrained
practice. Even so, they are common in their disregard for competitive
market pressures. First, we will describe them; second, we will show their
implications for employees who work under them.
To begin, a rigid hierarchy defines the public sector workplace.
Hierarchy defies the insights of the entrepreneurial and team-based
management model employed by modern high-performance business
organizations.
The durability of hierarchy stems from politically
accountable officials who favor avoiding the risk of public errors over the
possibility of achieving better results, concern for administrative law
forbidding policymaking by civil servants, and the desire to retain middleto low-level white-collar management positions for patronage purposes.
Equally important, however, is a deeper institutional distrust of workers.
The result is organizational bloat in the lower supervisory ranks and
enthusiasm for micromanagement. For example, when Indianapolis sought
to outsource Department of Public Works functions, the ratio of supervisors
to workers was originally one to four. As the local union prepared to bid
on the same work, its activity-based cost analyses revealed that it could not
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compete cost effectively while saddled with existing levels of managerial
overhead. Reducing the ratio to one to seventeen had no adverse effect on
service delivery. Though multiple management layers may once have been
necessary for effective communications, today these layers more often
destroy value. Besides imposing unnecessary costs, they suppress the flow
of good ideas from those workers most likely to have them. These effects
fuel broad organizational malaise, complacency, and discontent.
Second, narrow job classifications restrict workers' ability to move
horizontally in the organization, solve problems and develop crossfunctional skills. These restrictions impede the efficient redeployment of
workers to address the changing needs of the workplace and require
maintaining excess staff capacity to respond to fluctuating demand for
services. For example, crews charged with street cleaning after large
events can easily assist solid waste workers with fall leaf removal, and
vice-versa.
Yet job classification schemes long forbade this in
Indianapolis.
Besides undermining effective capacity management,
excessive classification frustrates efforts at cross-fertilization of ideas and
innovation across departments. In Indianapolis, shifting from more than a
hundred job classifications in 1993 to twelve in 1998 caused no disruption
and enabled new forms of interdepartmental cooperation.
Third, compensation and incentive structures are rarely linked to
performance. Compensation system design in the private sector is an everevolving discipline tied closely with vigorously contested metrics of value
creation. However, the effort is rarely even initiated in the public sector.
The lack of trust between labor and management, exacerbated by cronyism
and partisanship, makes reliance on discretion difficult. Performancebased pay thus requires quantifiable, neutral metrics. The persistent refrain
is that government work does not yield to accurate measurement. While
this critique may be appropriate in some contexts-for instance, agency
rulemaking or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion-it is flatly wrong
with regard to most city services. During its period of reform, Indianapolis
evaluated itself each month according to more than 200 metrics.
Incentive compensation need not be limited to piecework awards or
performance awards tied to particular outcomes. Contracted programs to
share savings eliminate most measurement concerns and place discretion
where it is least likely to be abused. Efforts to implement shared savings
plans have been historical oddities. One 1981 study noted only five
attempts at the local level, and three at the state level.' Recently, however,
they have become more common. In the 1990s, for example, Indianapolis
contracted with its own Department of Public Works to provide trash

1. See JOHN M. GREINER ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY AND MOTIVATION: A REVIEW OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 51 (1981).
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collection services. When the department beat its bid price by $2.IM in
1994, workers received average incentive pay of $1,750. Unfortunately,
these programs are the exception, not the norm. More often, compensation
is determined solely by rigid classification and seniority schemes. This
inhibits government's ability to incentivize workers, and it frustrates efforts
to fire rule-abiding workers who perform poorly.
Another factor is institutionalized risk aversion. Public organizations
often view rule- and process-compliance as measures of achievement,
rather than insisting upon successful program outcomes. This is, at least in
part, the legacy of hierarchical organization, narrow job classifications, and
Public managers focus on inputs like
flat compensation programs.
expenditures (gravel and labor hours), and in some cases on outputs (filled
potholes), but rarely on outcomes (smooth streets). The aversion to setting
and insisting upon clear performance expectations--or the tendency to set
the wrong ones-is deep-rooted and extends beyond the internal
management of public organizations. Contracts with private parties to
provide public services often betray the same impulse.
Finally, the government often has a monopoly on providing services to
the public. In addition, it often shields internal government monopolies
from market pressure. Because of their visibility, those monopolies most
often discussed concern government services provided to the public. For
example, the government may be the sole provider of street repair services.
Exposing these services like certain regulated utilities to competitive
pressure has stimulated reform of outdated bureaucratic management
structures. Those services provided to government itself are perhaps more
mundane: for instance, printing and travel services. These are not natural
monopolies; the yellow pages are replete with service providers. Private
corporations outsource these services, and scale and specialization reduces
their costs. Too often, the government insists upon providing these
services to itself, despite the absence of any comparative advantage. When
Indianapolis outsourced its internal printing and copying functions, costs
fell by 25%, pickup and delivery services improved, and clerical staff saved
hundreds of hours. The savings were available to either help reduce city
costs and taxes or to purchase additional core services.
III. VALUE DESTRUCTION AND THE LIFE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
It is difficult to foster healthy labor relations when the pool of public
values is stagnant or shrinking. Experience shows that the organizational
stasis caused by outdated, monopoly-era workplace rules impedes the
creation of public value. Managerial economics teaches that costs should
decline as cumulative production increases.
In the public sector,
improvements in ongoing productivity and efficiency should create value
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that can be shared between labor and the taxpayers. Unfortunately, when
outdated rules straitjacket government workers and prevent ongoing
improvement, the pie of value remains constant or shrinks and negotiations
become zero-sum. Predictably, labor relations turn antagonistic and the
taxpaying public becomes exasperated.
Consider a few examples of how value creation and labor relations
suffer from outdated rules and policies:
1. Policies that shield government functions from market competition
communicate the counterintuitive message that government workers are
inferior. This discourages the sense of ownership and assumption of
The
responsibility that pervade high-performance organizations.
implication of anti-competitive policies is that government employees are
incapable of competing successfully. Yet the last decade has shown that
when bureaucratic rules and processes are relaxed to permit government
workers to compete on the same terms as private competitors, public
employees often win. In Indianapolis, they won more than half the
contracts for which they competed. On the other hand, insistence upon
government monopolies leads to a self-perpetuating ethic of inferiority and
entitlement. This pathology destroys initiative. Furthermore, the absence
of performance-based pay exacerbates the tendency.
2. Anti-competitive policies also engender employee hostility toward
the innovation that is essential to ongoing productivity improvement. The
institutional obstacles to innovation arise from several subsidiary sources.
First, measuring inputs and evaluating rule- and process-compliance rather
than assessing program outcomes, fails to create needed incentives.
Instead, workplace norms encourage "keeping one's head down" and
maintaining an excessive level of deference to one's superiors. Second,
over time, government employees and institutions shed the analytical and
technical tools necessary to innovate in the delivery of services. Simple
private sector management tools like business process reengineering and
activity based costing yield surprisingly large results when introduced into
the private sector, primarily because they are applied to institutions that
have failed to self-critique on an ongoing basis. Even though many tools of
scientific management were borne of government necessity, for instance in
the defense contracting arena, many have failed to penetrate the operations
of state and local government.
3. Rigid and immutable workplace rules create adversarial labormanagement relations. When real value does not exist to be shared, union
leadership uses litigation and grievance filing to demonstrate its worth to
the rank and file. After a hard fought 1992 election campaign emphasizing
privatization, the new Indianapolis administration saw grievances triple to
between two and three hundred each year. In contrast, after the reforms,
only one grievance was filed in 1997 and one in 1998. Additionally, when
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unions file grievances, management typically responds by increasing the
amount of control it exerts over employees and unions often wasting even
more funds.
4. The galaxy of rules and procedures under which government
workers operate makes it difficult to attract and retain high caliber staff. In
addition, the managerial skills needed in the traditional public workplace
differ significantly from those needed to manage partnerships in a market
environment. Whether the partnership is with an outside group or with the
municipality's own employees, the partnering model requires managers to
negotiate with outside vendors, set clear goals and expectations, delegate
discretionary authority to workers executing against defined targets, and
reward performance. In contrast, the traditional model values enforcing
rule-compliance and other mechanisms of bureaucratic process control.
Local government management permits greater delegation and operational
discretion. In these contexts, the public manager requires skills nearly
identical to his or her private sector counterpart.
Government service imposes a high opportunity cost vis-A-vis private
sector opportunities. However, the compensation differential, while often
substantial, is not necessarily the greatest deterrent. Spending formative
years of professional life operating under bureaucratic procedures
magnifies the opportunity cost; so too does the perception of inefficiency
and laziness. Because government service can be viewed as a detriment to
one's resume, the dilemma is perpetuated: high quality executives eschew
government service, government performance lags, and the reality
approaches the perception. Of course for many, the sheer frustration that
accompanies working in inefficient organizations is enough to divert talent
elsewhere. Many of those managers who remain, particularly low-level
supervisors, tend to embrace their bureaucratic culture and oppose efforts
to make needed reforms. Some of these professionals chose government
service because of its risk-free environment.
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
The experience of the 1990s showed that cities could change the status
quo and sharply improve their labor-management relations. Even with a
history of good government Indianapolis had built up its bureaucracy over
time. In particular, its middle management had gradually accreted. City
leaders introduced competition in the 1990s to structurally realign internal
labor-management incentives. Competition began to erode inefficient
processes and rules; in doing so, it enabled further reform and more
competition. This result squares with the data: while the number of cities
contracting for services remained stagnant between 1988 and 1997, the
number of services contracted for by those cities increased by 16%, and the
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number of cities contracting for greater than 30% of their services
increased more than tenfold.2
Reformed labor-management relations arise by partnering with labor
to pursue competition, not by insisting on privatization. Just as replacing
government monopolies with private monopolies fails to generate
guaranteed savings,3 privatization alone will not reform the public
In contrast to privatization, competition expresses no
workplace.
preference as to who wins: it emphasizes outcomes, not inputs. Experience
has shown that government workers freed from bureaucratic rules often
compete successfully against private sector actors. The desire for cost
reductions and superior policy outcomes motivates many competition
initiatives, and Indianapolis saved an average of 20% on services that it put
out for bid. Yet the transformative effect of competition on human
resources management and labor-management relations is equally dynamic.
Competition only creates better public employee output if it is
accompanied by major changes in the traditional bureaucratic systems.
These changes are necessary to ensure that public employees can compete
effectively and to create the context for vastly improved relationships
between labor and management. Here are seven reforms that would be
effective places to begin instituting change:
1. Increase discretion and reduce vertical hierarchy. Liberating
workers creates value for many stakeholders. Eliminating unnecessary
hierarchy enables workers to assume responsibility for outcomes, to
implement innovations more immediately, and to compete with lower
overhead costs. Many changes are necessary to fully empower workers
from updating procurement rules to rewriting job descriptions, enhancing
training, and more. However, to reduce hierarchical controls, an important
first step is to recruit and develop energetic managers committed to reform.
Very often, the enthusiasm of hourly workers who understand the
possibilities of reform vastly exceeds that of their immediate white-collar
supervisors. Political leaders and senior executives need to be willing to
make tough decisions, including encouraging superfluous employees to
take advantage of retirement incentives and outplacement job services to
persuade them to exit the public workplace. Senior leaders should also
2. REASON PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE,
REPORT ON PRIVATIZATION 3 (2000).
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3. In Indianapolis, the initial foray into privatization was an effort to outsource billing
for sewer services (an annual city cost of nearly $3M incurred to collect $40M in
receivables). City officials approached Indianapolis Water Corporation (IWC), the private
water utility, which offered to perform the job for 5% less than the city's cost. Only when
bidding was opened to all central Indiana utilities did the IWC proposal become compelling:
a 30% cost reduction, plus an extensive program to collect missing revenue and share the
proceeds with the city. STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CITY 17-19
(1997).
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commit to being accessible to workers at all levels in the organization
(including by email) and to respond promptly to suggestions.
2. Organize employees in teams responsible for solving discrete
problems. Enabling horizontal cooperation complements the reduction in
vertical hierarchy. Teams, whether physical or virtual, should be flexible
and able to form and then to reform as issues change. Rather than
organizing around inputs or processes, individuals must take responsibility
for outcomes and be evaluated accordingly. All employees must own
responsibility for some effort. E-Government and other technology tools
allow public employees to share information, work concurrently, act as
teams, and measure results in ways never before possible.
3. Solve non-monetary labor complaints quickly and effectively.
These issues may be job security, workplace conditions or equipment and
training. The foundation of good labor relations is built on taking workers
seriously, addressing their concerns, and treating them as colleagues. In
the private sector, the experience of former Alcoa Chairman and CEO Paul
O'Neill is instructive. When O'Neill became the first outsider to lead the
aluminum giant, the industry faced depressed prices and longstanding labor
relations problems. He immediately established workplace safety as the
number one priority, higher even than profits, and he fired managers who
did not adopt the program. He ended Alcoa's policy of paying for
memberships to an all-white Pittsburgh country club, and he implemented
an identical profit-sharing plan for white collar and hourly workers. Over
time, Alcoa developed model labor relations and achieved an extraordinary
economic transformation. 4 Similarly, municipal officials must address
issues unrelated to compensation, including race relations, safety, training
and workplace conditions. And they must make clear to middle managers
that top city officials and union leaders work on the same team. Where this
has occurred, as in Indianapolis, cost savings have followed.
City officials can begin by pledging to minimize short-term forced
layoffs as they introduce competition. Privatization alters the mix between
public and private provision of public goods; while private contractors
often hire public workers, they do not hire them exclusively. The aging
demographics of the public workforce makes this commitment more
practicable than it might otherwise seem: unless replenished, the public
workforce will shrink as baby boomers retire. Retirement incentives and
outplacement programs can accelerate this process. Still, management
must commit to help displaced workers find other public sector jobs.
Complaints circulating in the workplace become a symbol of
management indifference when simple requests go unfulfilled. If handled
correctly and consistently, addressing basic concerns can lead to much
4. See Michael Lewis, O'Neill's List, N.Y.

TIMES,

Jan. 13, 2002, § 6, at 20.
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improved relations. The simplest requests are often the most important:
replacing a broken piece of equipment, enhancing the appearance of a
warehouse, providing breaks and better water availability on very hot days,
or dealing with a biased manager. Upper management is only infrequently
even aware of these requests.
4. Loosen entrenched impediments to internal labor mobility.
Working collaboratively with union leaders to enhance internal labor
mobility is essential not only to enable the reassignment of displaced
workers, but also to ensure optimal deployment of human resources and the
full development of workers' human capital. The joint labor-management
team should relax seniority rules, significantly widen job classification
schemes, and alter rigid pay scales in favor of performance-based, valuesharing models.
5. Guide managerial and compensation practice with objective,
scientific performance metrics. Objective metrics overcome the lack of
trust that traditionally pervades the labor-management relationship.
Particularly in basic services, the public sector can readily import private
sector managerial accounting practices. Sharing these skills beyond the
managerial group is essential to enable public employees to identify
unnecessary costs and bid for public work. Value metrics defined in
advance, and shared by both managerial and hourly workers, form the basis
of effective compensation systems that neither rely upon managerial
discretion nor lend themselves to political abuse.
6. Remove obstacles that prevent laborfrom competing successfully.
As a department's functions are put out for competitive tender, public
workers seeking to retain the function search for inefficient practices that
can be eliminated. Take procurement rules as an example. If accounting
systems allocate costs properly, public employees seeking to bid
competitively will either expose the inefficiencies of internal monopolies,
or private sector competitors not bound to inefficient practices will submit
superior bids. Empowering workers to realize these savings opportunities
creates better employer-employee relations and better products. Executives
must take on high cost, internal monopolies that cause organizational
tension and division. Access to the right equipment, parts and tools makes
better results possible.
7. Celebrate success. The road to competition often proceeds one
contract at a time. Celebrate successes frequently, and recognize failures
for what they are. Study them carefully, propose solutions, and move on.
These reforms can advance other important public goals. City
officials should identify important public values and structure their
partnership relationships to achieve them. For example, consider minority
entrepreneurialism.
Internal monopolies preempt contracting by
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minorities; when competition is introduced, it can be structured to facilitate
minority participation.
Municipal contracts' in Indianapolis were
traditionally bid in sizes too large for many small, minority businesses to
bond at the required level. By aggressively putting more city services out
for bid between 1992 and 1998, and defining contracts carefully to enable
women and minorities to participate, the percentage of minority
participation in total municipal contracts grew by 55%.5 No quotas were
required and the city also saved $400 million.6 Without imposing
subcontracting requirements, the city's articulation of these values led city
contractors, as a customer service matter, to meet and exceed the city's
expectations in this area, expanding the circle of productivity and
developing business relationships that spill into private sector work.
The public workplace often suffers from structural barriers to
diversity, and competition can remove many of them. Performance matters
when government agencies are held accountable for financial results and
compensated accordingly; patronage and seniority do not. By relaxing job
classifications,
rethinking compensation
schemes,
and thinning
management ranks, outstanding performers have incentives and the
capability to rise from hourly to managerial positions, and top officials
have heightened incentives to promote them. In departments marked by
disproportionately white managers and disproportionately non-white
workers, ending the impermeable labor-management divide calms racial
animosity and broadens the composition of management.
V.

CONCLUSION

Local governments face challenges that show no sign of abatement.
Increased financial resources are unavailable as municipalities cope with
under-performing public schools, persistent poverty, juvenile criminality,
child abuse, and the crisis of affordable housing. As the renaissance in
urban America revealed when it began in the 1990s, reforming labormanagement relations by removing bureaucratic procedures and structures
can unlock substantial public value. The Indianapolis experience teaches
that bureaucratic stasis need not prevail. While individual governments
will adopt solutions suited to their own particular circumstances, the
pathology of the traditional public workplace mandates that rethinking
labor-management relations be a top agenda item. Government agencies
will otherwise lag behind their private sector competitors, destroying finite
human and financial resources.
Instead, municipal leaders can use
competition to work a transformation that embraces partnership with labor.
5. Stephen Goldsmith, Value-Added Diversity, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 235
(1999).
6. Id.
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The public, city leaders, and most especially the union members whose
potential is too often untapped all have much to gain.

